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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD LYNN CARLSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RICHARD LYNN CARLSON 
Docket No. 950108-CA 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994) of Defendants appeal from his final 
judgment of conviction of assault by a prisoner, a third degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann § 76-5-102.5 (1994). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Pertinent statutory provisions and rules included in the 
addendum are: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1994). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue; Whether the prosecutor's improper interrogation and 
arguments to the jury were so improper that there was a 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the improper comments, 
the result would have been different. 
Standard of Review; On review, this court will determine 
whether the prosecution's conduct constituted error as a 
1 
matter of law by calling to the jurors' attention matters 
they were not justified in considering in reaching a 
verdict. This court will reverse if the misconduct is 
determined to be harmful so that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant. State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987); State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 
342 (Ut. App. 1993). 
Issue; Whether the prosecution's misconduct was 
sufficiently obvious and harmful to constitute "plain error" 
in light of defense counsel's failure to object. 
Standard of Review: Notwithstanding defense counsel's 
failure to object, reversal is appropriate if the error is 
both "obvious" and "harmful". Plain and obvious error is 
harmful if the likelihood of a different result is 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004 (Utah App. 1994). "Plain 
Error" is a determination of law and this court will not 
defer to the trial court's failure to recognize the error 
below. 
Issue: Whether defense counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecution's misconduct denied defendant the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Standard of Review: This court will not defer to the lower 
court when making a determination whether the defendant was 
2 
denied the ineffective assistance of counsel. This issue is 
subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal question. 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). 
Moreover, this issue is raised now for the first time on 
appeal and has not been presented to the trial court for its 
consideration. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of assault by a prisoner, a 
third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5. 
2. Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below: 
On November 30, 1994, a jury convicted Mr. Richard Carlson 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
with the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. (R 134, 136). 
On January 9, 1995, the court sentenced Mr. Carlson to an 
indeterminate term "not to exceed five years" in the Utah State 
Prison, consecutive to the sentence Mr. Carlson is already 
serving. (R 137). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Timothy Smith was an inmate confined in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. On September 4, 1994, his face was partially covered by a 
blanket and he was forcibly pushed by another inmate into the 
bars in tier 2-E. Smith's nose was broken and his face was cut. 
3 
(R 304) . Inmate Smith had been previously housed in another area 
of the jail, tier "2-C-9", but had demanded that he be moved 
because his property was allegedly being stolen. (R 278). When 
Smith was moved into tier 2-E, his former cellmates, "the 
Mexicans", told the inmates in 2-E that Smith was a "snitch". (R 
285, 324-28, 336); (R 324). There were at least 16 and as many 
as 24 inmates in that tier. (R 134,201, 156). 
When this message circulated, a 2-E inmate named Kidder 
rolled up Smith's blanket and tossed it on the floor, together 
with a demand that Smith get out of 2-E. (R 288-89). Smith 
moved towards the cell bars and called for the jailer to "Get me 
out of here." (R 287). Smith was surrounded by several inmates. 
Smith did not know the two inmates who were then closest to him, 
and could not identify them, but Smith claimed that "[t]hey were 
setting themselves up, you know, to jump me and everything." (R 
287-88). 
Despite the fact that defendant Richard Carlson was not one 
of those inmates and that Smith's head was partially covered by a 
blanket, Smith claimed that Carlson also had taunted him and 
participated in the incident. (R 289-90). No one else 
corroborated Smith's claim. In an effort to describe his 
environment, Smith admitted that the lighting in the jail cell 
was darker than the lighting in the courtroom, with a small, 
florescent light "in the corner . . . [b]ack against the wall, 
maybe six feet away, six or seven feet high." (R 304-5). 
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Contrary to Smith's claims, at that time Mr. Carlson was in 
another part of the tier washing out his blanket that was 
"stinky" from spilt milk. (R 394, 399, 402, 406, 435). In jail, 
"[i]f you were to have a dirty blanket, it would probably take a 
week or two to get another one from downstairs. Later, after the 
incident, when the officers came, they got Carlson's blanket "out 
of the sink." (R 399). 
Inmate Smith testified that someone forcibly hit him against 
the bars of the tier cell door. (R 290). Although his back was 
to the surrounding inmates he claimed that it was Mr. Carlson who 
had hit him. (R 290-1). Smith's observations also may have been 
either hindered or untimely because another person had thrown a 
blanket at him, which landed over his head. (R 289-90, 126). 
Inmate Smith's identification was particularly uncertain because 
of the close proximity of the other two inmates at the precise 
moment of the assault and the blanket obscuring Smith's vision. 
(R 287-88, 290, 369, 124-25); 
According to jail guard George Tonga, when he eventually 
responded to the scene after Smith's injury, he noticed Carlson, 
"but he [Carlson] wasn't the closest one to him [Smith]. He 
[Carlson] was off to the right. And the one that was just 
walking around swinging a towel this way, last name Martinez, he 
was threatening something in Spanish." (R 3 69). 
There is no dispute that inmate Smith was injured. His nose 
bled and his face had been cut and bruised. (R 378). However, 
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two eyewitness inmates, testified that Richard Carlson was not 
responsible and was not involved in the altercation. John Hender 
confirmed that Carlson was washing his blanket at the time. (R 
394, 399, 405). Ted Hall verified Hender's observations. (R 
317, 328). Inmate Todd Dennis testified that "I didn't actually 
see who hit him [Smith], but I know it wasn't Rick [Carlson] that 
did it. Rick was on the other side of the tier". (R 337). The 
entire case hinged on how the jury would be persuaded based upon 
the witnesses' credibility. The court itself observed that 
'•credibility will be very important in this case." (R 173). 
At trial, the prosecution injected personal comment and 
belief into his argument and interrogation of the witnesses and 
improperly questioned defense witnesses under Rule 609, Utah R. 
Evidence. (R 455, 464, 403-8, 350). Moreover, the credibility 
of inmate Smith was so ". . . very important in this case". (R 
166). Notwithstanding, the court allowed inmate Smith to sit 
with the prosecutor at counsel table (R 173), as if giving the 
appearance of being the State's "representative". 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The prosecution may be zealous in its representation, but it 
engages in misconduct when it improperly insinuates matters not 
in evidence, when it injects personal opinion into its argument, 
and questioning, and when it addresses areas which the jury may 
not consider. In a case where witness credibility was the factor 
determinative to the jury's verdict, the prosecution's comments 
and questioning of witnesses improperly crossed the permissible 
bounds of advocacy. 
A single instance, standing alone, might arguably be 
considered harmless. However, where witness credibility was 
crucial to identification, the jury's fact finding role became 
infected by the prosecution's repeated inappropriate questioning 
and misconduct with the defense witnesses. Defendant asserts 
that the prosecution's conduct tilted the scales of fairness and 
propriety and prejudiced Mr. Carlson's right to a fair trial. 
The failure of Defendant's counsel to object at trial to 
each and every instance does not lessen the prejudicial impact of 
the improper injection of personal opinion and the inappropriate 
cross examination. The prosecution's misconduct was plain error 
which this court should remedy, even absent objections by defense 
counsel at trial. However, if the prosecution's errors were not 
sufficiently plain and obvious to invoke the "plain error" rule, 
then Mr. Carlson was denied the effective assistance of counsel 




DEFENDANT'S VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
PROSECUTORS COMMENTS AND CONDUCT AT TRIAL WERE 
IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL 
The prosecutions conduct at trial was both improper and 
prejudicial and defendants guilty verdict should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial• In State v. Tillman, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a conviction must be reversed when the verdict is 
improperly influenced by prosecutorial misconduct, 
A prosecutor's actions and remarks constitute 
misconduct that merits reversal if the actions or 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters 
they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict and, under the circumstances 
of the particular case, the error is substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant. 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). Accord State v. 
Emmett 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 
(Utah App. 1993). The verdict should be overturned when 
prosecutor's comments or conduct are both improper and 
prejudicial. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS REGARDING GUILT OF 
ACCUSED AND CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES WAS IMPROPER 
AND HARMFUL 
Whether a prosecutor's statements are improper and 
constitute error is whether the remarks call to the jurors' 
attention matters which they would not be justified in 
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considering in reaching a verdict. When improper statements are 
deemed harmful, reversal is required. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 
781, 785 (Utah 1992). 
The harm accompanying improper prosecutorial statements has 
long been recognized: 
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of 
witnesses and expressing his personal opinion 
concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: 
such comments can convey the impression that evidence 
not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, 
supports the charges against the defendant and can thus 
jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on 
the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and 
the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur 
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the 
Government's judgment rather than it own view of the 
evidence. 
State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)). 
In Hopkins, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the jury 
should not have considered the following improper argument: 
But remember that what I say is not evidence. The fact 
that this representative of the State is plainly 
impressed by the evidence is no call for you to be 
impressed by the evidence. When is the thing proven? 
A thing is proven individually. It's only when an 
individual, not a group but an individual, accumulates 
enough observations and impressions and reasonings and 
feelings to satisfy themselves [sic] personally that 
that is so. Impressions that build to definite proof 
are nontransferable. It is impossible for me to convey 
in words in any capacity why the State is so impressed 
with the evidence in this case. 
Hopkins. 782 P.2d at 479. 
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The same sort of improper argument was presented to the jury 
in the present case. During closing argument, the prosecution 
argued: 
Was it Mr. Carlson who did it? Mr. Smith said 
absolutely, unequivocally, I had to look at Mr. 
Carlson. When he testified. You can examine this 
matter testified [sic]. You will have to judge whether 
or not he is telling you the truth. The State admits 
defense witnesses have not been credible. They have 
been motivated by reasons of their own not to tell the 
truth and the whole truth, as they sworn that they 
would. (R 455) (emphasis added). 
Later in its argument, the prosecution's personal attack 
continued: 
[Mr. Carlson's attorney] talked about the ethics of the 
defense witnesses. The State submits that the defense 
witnesses have no ethics. They have only one concern, and 
that is their own self-interest and the interest of their 
particular friends.(R 464)(emphasis added).1 
These arguments are, in effect, the expressions of personal 
opinion and should not have been heard or considered by the jury. 
See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (2d ed. 1980) 
("It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his 
or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of 
any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant"). 
1
 During closing argument, the prosecution offered the 
same type of improper hyperbole to the jury: "When I asked him 
questions about his involvement, what was it? He had to think 
about this first before he could give an answer. You saw the way 
he testified. Was that the testimony of a truthful man? Someone 
you could believe? Was he someone who was always hedging? Never 
answering any questions directly, but trying to get around them. 
The State suggests he was not a believable witness." (R 451) 
10 
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he well knew it was improper when he asked it and that it had 
already achieved its intended purpose. 
This court should overturn defendant's guilty verdict in 
light of the prosecutor's prejudicial misconduct. 
D. IMPROPER REFERENCE TO WITNESSES' PAST CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The prosecutor's constant reference to defense witness Todd 
Dennis' past criminal convictions was improper and prejudicial to 
the defendant. Under Utah Rules of Evidence 404 and 609, past 
criminal convictions are only admissible to attack the 
credibility of a defendant or witness. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 
785. Specifically, Rule 609(a) provides: 
(a) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than the accused 
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to 
Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which 
the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has 
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs it prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. Utah R. Evid. 
609(a). 
A prosecutor's Rule 609(a) inquiry is limited to the nature 
of the crime, the date of the conviction and the punishment. See 
United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977)2, 
State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990) (prior 
conviction inquires "should 
2
 Utah Rule 609 and Federal Rule 609 are identical and Utah 
appellate courts have followed the federal interpretations. See 
State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 654 (Utah 1989); State v. Tucker, 
800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990). 
18 
Not only were the prosecutor's comments in this case 
improper, but they were also prejudicial. The prosecutor's 
comments may even be presumed prejudicial where the evidence of 
guilt is not strong. 
In a case with less compelling proof, this Court will 
more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion 
of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting 
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will be improperly influenced through remarks of 
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be 
searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to 
influence, and a small degree of influence may be 
sufficient to affect the verdict. 
State v. Trov 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). The evidence of Mr. 
Carlson's guilt in this case was weak and supported only by 
Inmate Smith's claim that someone looking like Carlson was coming 
toward him while his back was turned. (R 289-90). Mr. Smith did 
not even know who Mr. Carlson was at the time, but picked out his 
photograph later. (R 3 62). Moreover, there was no physical 
evidence to corroborate Smith's claim that it was Mr. Carlson who 
attacked him. 
There was not an "abundance of evidence of guilt" in this 
case as in Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 475. Rather, the Jury's verdict 
was apparently based only on the victim-inmate's testimony of 
what he saw after a blanket was thrown by Kidder to partially 
block his vision. This lack of evidence required the jury to 
choose between the conflicting testimony of the prisoners. 
11 
The last thing the jury heard from the prosecution in this 
case was deprecating comments regarding the defense witnesses, 
all while inmate Smith sat with the prosecutor at counsel table. 
Because credibility and character of the defense witnesses were 
the heart of the defense, the personally disparaging comments by 
the prosecution where particularly harmful. The entire case 
depended upon the jury's "search for guidance" in weighing the 
credibility of the defense witnesses verses the victim. 
This court should presume that the prosecutor's personal 
arguments were prejudicial, as well as inappropriate and that 
there was great potential for harm resulting from the 
prosecutor's disparaging personal comments of the defense 
witnesses. 
B. UNSUPPORTED INNUENDOS REGARDING FACTS NOT IN 
EVIDENCE PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FAIR 
TRIAL. 
The prosecution violated another well-settled principle by 
arguing matters not in evidence or suggesting unsupported 
innuendo. It is error to ask an accused a question that implies 
the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can 
prove the existence of the fact. "Otherwise, the only limit on 
such a line of questioning would be the prosecutor's 
imagination." State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992) 
(footnote omitted). See also. State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 
12 
3 4 2 - 4 4 (U t ah Aj l Il 9 9 3 ) ; 'U.S. v . S i l v e r s t e , / , . f 3 7 F . 2 d 8 6 4 , 868 
( l oii") c\ :i s 8 l) . 
Criticising such prosecutorial tantins. the cou. 
Emmett case observed that *• * : ne pc: r :>-; prosecutor asr. 
/M
- Emmett'£ *~ * • * * * ^  ^ ^  * -;e j~i2 
ano. - . I ;i :: i i .- a 
prosecutor's ajlegations, tne question nevertheless implies that 
the defense attorney manufactured Emmett' <= testimony 
e : 
786 « 
The prosecuti >n's attempts n this case were similarly 
U l l III1 I'l I I l l l S t r I i l 
Q [by tnt ; Now, Mr. Hender. you really 
know a lot »»^_ L.U tnis case than you are letting 
on. don't you? 
A
 L^i JH Hi i-'ti': from where ao yuu get that 
assumption? 
Q Well, i on ai: e the one that keeps communicating from 
Mr. Carlson to Mr. Smith; Isn't that true? 
A What do you mean? 
[Mr. Carlson's attorney ]i your Honor I tfil] have to 
object to this line of questioning. There is no 
evidence that this occurred . 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may go 
forward. 
Q [by the prosecution:] Now it is true, isn't it. Mr. 
Hender. you are the person who in the past has taken 
messages from Mr. Carlson over the to Mr. Smith? 
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[Mr. Carlson's attorney]: Your Honor, I am going to 
have to object again. I believe there is a possible 
Fifth Amendment claim here of witness tampering and I 
will have to object on those grounds. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
[Mr. Carlson:] Would you repeat the question. 
Q [by the prosecution:] Isn't it true that you are 
the one who has been carrying messages from Mr. Carlson 
to Mr. Smith, talking about this case? 
A The only way that would be possible for anyone [is] 
if they were a trustee. I am not a trustee. I don't 
have any means to carry any messages to anyone. . . 
Q You haven't sent any messages to Mr. Smith about 
this case? 
A Heck no. He has got nothing to do with me. I don't 
even care about this guy. He has not got nothing to do 
with me and I don't know why he puts a finger on Rick 
when Rick wasn't even in the room when anything 
happened to him. He is just looking for someone to 
blame for this. 
(R 403-05) (emphasis added). 
The Emmett court has condemned such tactics: 
To allow this sort of examination would be to allow the 
imaginative and overzealous prosecutor to concoct a 
damaging line of examination which could leave with the 
jury the impression that defendant was anything the 
question, by innuendo, seemed to suggest. If the 
questions were persistent enough and cleverly enough 
framed, no amount of denial on the part of the 
defendant would be able to erase the impression in the 
mind of the jury that the prosecutor actually had such 
facts on hand and that probably there was some truth to 
the insinuations. 839 P.2d at 787 fn.18 (citations 
omitted). 
A continuous badgering of Mr. Hender regarding facts not in 
evidence is just the sort of examination that the Emmett Court 
decried. The impact on the jury of these baseless innuendos was 
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further magnified -nen the court failed tc sustain the counsel's 
object* fc ~ * - .irrrocr: "»*"" auest:r~v— suaqesting additional 
credence
 t . -i»,T*.;«r 
presented any evidence - .bstantiare his innuendos. 
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never attempted to establish, let alone prjve. 
Or *?o*-r direr- ind cr">GG ^xir^a^^r u^"de* * ~?rtified 
that L- _- . 
Mr. Hender testified repeatedly that :.. * r^ : *;t otner side of 
the cell - ~ ^  +---«o. Nevertheless, i-*-*- prosecution pers^t^d *„ 
t -l!«].;'l! " 
to ta l iacK of evidence on trie matter: 
Q
 fcbv the prosecutio: -ow, did you see anyone 
actually hit Mr, --*•*• ; - behind? Push his head into 
t h ^ "i ^  i " - r*--
A
 fcoy M. a v i civ T Have already answered that 
q\l(ac;f 
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Q And isn't it true, Mr. Hender, that you actually saw 
Mr. Smith assaulted? 
A Have I not already answered that question? 
Q And isn't it true, Mr. Hender, that you saw Mr. 
Carlson run up and hit Mr. Smith in the back of the 
head and push his head into those bars; isn't that 
true? 
A That is not, not even. I told you, Mr. Carlson was 
on the other side of the cell. 
Q And isn't it true, Mr. Hender, you have been 
attempting to get Mr. Smith not to go forward with 
these charges in this case? 
A I don't even know this guy. 
(R 403, 407, 408) (emphasis added). 
This continued unsubstantiated questioning, with its 
insinuations as to matters not in evidence, was an improper 
attempt "to induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment 
rather than its own view of the evidence." State v. Hopkins, 782 
P.2d 475, 480 (Utah 1989). Additionally, the prosecution was 
able to imbue validity through sheer repetition, as a means to 
counter denials by a witness. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 787, n.18 
("if the questions were persistent enough and cleverly enough 
framed, no amount of denial on the part of the defendant would be 
able to erase the impression in the mind of the jury that the 
prosecutor actually had such facts on hand and that probably 
there was some truth to the insinuations"). 
This Court should reverse the defendant's conviction because 
of the prosecutor's improper and prejudicial innuendos and 
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inferences regard: * ~\ r sported " rhr evidence. It is 
reasonably doubtFi*' ^ha1" jr»*' ' ,Knr a^ -i-or* ooar*«-, ~. persistent 
baagex 
impressicr- *";at th- prosecutor actually had undisclosed evidence 
on hand to prove I s infer^nc ^ubimt that absent the 
i 
likelihood that, a esult /uore livorabic ' * ne delenaant could 
have, been achieved, 
C THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ASKED FOR WITNESS 
COMMENT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF HIS OWN WITNESS. 
T ;~:itor to as* a witness to comment 
on w.*c w;cdiL:.;:\ :-.L:.;-JI witness, because M. . . it suggests 
to the jury that e- witness - -Tiitt.rvi „ -•: 'u;; » ven tnc 
there ">~^
 0+-un^ ny^Tanaf: ^ ^r ^"-^ *"""> •^r,^ti,.sterc M 19 
I i d l e v. aueidrii ^ " :~*~ ~ IS) . 
In the case at hand, the prosecutor properly attempted to 
sol icit from Mr Hender h :i s opini on regard ing supposed 
hy po the I::i zal tes t::i ii :: m: IJ ::  •£ Offi
 m a 
prosecutor demanded of Mr. Hender, "So it >fficet r .3.* n 1 come 
to court and said he knew nothing abcLt -: ; wet blanket, how 
was not only argumentativ e, but also sough t specu] ation beyond 
Mr. Hender's knowledge. The inquiry was prejudicially damaging 
e v e n though defense counsel's objection was sustained. 
the prosecutor's failure to defend his own question sugge it 
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he well knew it was improper when he asked it and that it had 
already achieved its intended purpose. 
This court should overturn defendant's guilty verdict in 
light of the prosecutor's prejudicial misconduct. 
D. IMPROPER REFERENCE TO WITNESSES' PAST CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The prosecutor's constant reference to defense witness Todd 
Dennis' past criminal convictions was improper and prejudicial to 
the defendant. Under Utah Rules of Evidence 404 and 609, past 
criminal convictions are only admissible for the limited purpose 
of attacking the credibility of a defendant or witness. See 
Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785. Specifically, Rule 609(a) provides: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime . . . (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
However, in order to insure that information regarding prior 
convictions is used only for impeachment purposes, a prosecutor's 
Rule 609(a) inquiry is limited to the nature of the crime, the 
date of the conviction and the punishment. See United States v. 
Wolf. 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977)2, State v. Tucker, 800 
P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990) (prior conviction inquires "should 
2
 Utah Rule 609 and Federal Rule 609 are identical and 
Utah appellate courts have followed the federal interpretations. 
See State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 654 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990). 
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be limited to the nature of the crime, the date of the conviction 
and the ^\nisr~c~+ 
Howeve ..«-.• 
inquiry beyond the well esuc ned frames ::x u ,-ippropr iane 
questioning regarding prior rnnvictiom ..ature cf U"ie crime, 
t • r.. 
Q [Pre ..:r: Now, you
 tMi. ^-n;. -1 told [the defense 
attc^JiW ] here you had beer , f^i ^r a number of 
felonies; is that right? 
A Ye! 
Q Three cuunta of forgery? Forge some, checks? 
A Yes, : <:. J. 
Q Di: sn't' it? 
A Yes . support my d, . 
Q You were convicted of burglary? 
A Uh-huh 
Q P r e t t y u i s f i u n e a u d m i ; i e : ^ ••. , .^n^ „ ,. ? 
A Yeah, 
Q Theft by receivii lg. Again dishonest, isn't it? 
A Yes, si i: 
Q So in your past you have done things that are dishonest 
to achieve whatever P ^ Q vnn felt were important; isn't 
' that true? 
A Yes 
Q Now isn't it true, Mr, Dennis, that you were willing to 
lie today just to achieve the end that is important to 
you and that is not to have a snitch jacket; isn't that 
true? 
1 9 
A No, sir. 
(R 350) (emphasis added). 
The Prosecution's repeated editorializing, "dishonest, isn't 
it?", was both a misstatement of the law and beyond the 
permissible scope of cross examination. See State v. Brown. 771 
P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah App. 1989) (theft is not necessarily a 
crime involving dishonesty); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 
(Utah 1989)(attempted robbery is not necessarily a crime of 
dishonesty). In Tucker, this court cautioned that a prosecutor 
may not "parade the details of the prior crime in front of the 
jury." Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822. The prosecutor's questioning 
prejudicially exceeded inquiry allowed by Rule 609 and supporting 
case law. 
The trial court also erred by allowing the evidence of Mr. 
Dennis' prior convictions for theft and burglary which are not 
necessarily crimes of dishonesty or false statement. There was 
no evidence or proffer that these crimes were committed by 
dishonest means. Admission of these convictions for impeachment 
was error. This Court should reverse the conviction of defendant 
because the prosecutor tainted the testimony of defense witnesses 
through improper questioning about prior convictions. 
The foregoing discussion has illustrated several instances 
of prosecutorial misconduct that were not only improper, but also 
prejudicial to the defense and a fair trial. The various 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct, constitute "remarks 
20 
[which] 'called t: the jurors' --""tention ntters which they would 
not be ^istified i considering eachina a verdic* t. 
819 P w. - O 
instances oi t.ie |. * osecutoi o uiiscondUv' ^^w o^n^wxc.it 
for reversal, .u! t the misconduc* - zibined requires a new 
t - ^ : ^ ^ 
prosecutorial misconduct . _
 fc ... , -a*. .~^w _.,„.
 rc^ . . ience 
of Mr. Carlscr nvolvement was not stror j in tnis case, 
as in State , . Pai/.er -^  . - ^ >^ , >. > _ ^9^ J ;, uuxo 
case "turned primai i e^t^ i a 
credibility" ct Lf.ate Smitn and, tne defense -,ewitnesses. 
Because of th^ nature ot rb^ r-osecution'^ evidence ana • • ** 
number * 3 
cumulatively narmt .. and reverse. 
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POINT II 
THE PROSECUTION'S MISCONDUCT WAS PLAIN ERROR AND THE ERROR 
WAS NOT WAIVED BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT. 
Even though Mr. Carlson7s counsel failed to timely object 
to the prosecution's improper comments and questions, the right 
to object was not waived because the error was plain and obvious. 
Failure to object to improper remarks will constitute a 
waiver of the claim, unless the remarks constitute 
plain error. Plain error is error that is both harmful 
and obvious. This court reviews allegations of plain 
error despite the lack of a timely objection, provided, 
of course, that the trial court was not led into error. 
We do so in order to avoid manifest injustice and 
because, if the error is obvious, the trial court has 
the opportunity to address the error regardless of the 
fact that it was never brought to the court's 
attention. 
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (Emphasis added). 
In this case, not every instance of misconduct argued in 
Point I was preserved by timely objection. Notwithstanding, each 
instance of the prosecutions repeated misconduct presents a 
cumulative effect of both error and prejudice which should have 
been plain and obvious to both the trial court and counsel. 
Moreover, the prosecution's comments violated several 
ethical rules. ABA Model Rule 3.4(e) both requires that a lawyer 
must not state a personal opinion about the credibility of a 
witness or the guilt or innocence of an accused, and prohibits a 
lawyer from referring to material that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence. ABA Standards of Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) 
(2d ed. 1980) states: "It is unprofessional conduct for the 
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prosecutor to express his or her personal belief - - opinion as ' 
the truth or falsi*1, *^' a ^ * r i?!o^ evidence r *-i- auilt wi-
the def ei idai 1 t 
under the cases and these erhical standards, t. .t trial court 
should have addressed the misconduct, regardless of whether 
del * * 
Moreover * " j v. Tili.> - , *^ >. . * .*,
 4e: explained 
that the State's '* r.iciatior is assure '"hat nustiee is 
That i ~f er-reachii 
exaggera . ^ i ^ , t ^ _ . .. :.e orosecu? ' n 
the deliberation process. M Tillman 750 P.:d at 557. 
The trial couit nad sufficient crr^r* "«•*•»-*- - 3ddresr +-V r 
error given the obviousness c - i. i « M/i*r t earn li i innj mid 
exaggerated improper examination or defense witnesses. "Il "Il i! :! 




DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT DENIED DEFENDANT 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In the event this Court concludes that the argued errors at 
trial were not "plain error," then Mr. Carlson was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to 
object to the varied and numerous improper and prejudicial 
comments during the trial. In State v. Frame, the Utah Supreme 
Court first established the Strickland criteria to show 
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 
(Utah 1986); accord State v. Villarreal 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). 
1. Did counsel's representation fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness of professionally competent 
assistance? and; 
2. But for the ineffective assistance, there is a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome. 
(723 P.2d at 405). See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
By failing to object to the prosecutor/s badgering of 
witnesses and inappropriate argument, defense counsel's fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and prejudiced the defendant's fair trial. 
As discussed herein, the prosecutor's statements were 
improper and harmful. While defense counsel did object to a few 
of the prejudicial questions, counsel failed to object to other 
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equally prejud:cia statements and arguments* The comments and 
que*"4" i "*" *• *~ -*?•** r~s~ ^"^'ir^c %^;^prci *"* r1; y: *»-**. credibility 
of „icri^. ., s 
defense Because credibility was at : r;- ; > ear' ci tnis 
dispute *-'-<- '. mprorer -"h* lenqes wr,pK wer- not r ^ ected t ~» 
s decision wa to eirner accept t:;e intense eyewitnesses or 
inmate Smith sittii •* at c^unse1 table. 
counsel shou. ; :av- objected in each msta ,ct** -ocordingly, 
defense counsel's lailure to object «aj a ieficient 
v. Humphries, 818 P. 2d 1027, 1- D2S • (U t al: i IS '91), the 
Supreme Court of r* ah concluded that defense counsel's failure to 
o: * * -t- - *• r's commem on defendant's riTh4" ~~^ 
teswi ; vuwSixiuU. .neffective assistance of noun e., le^use of 
the inappropriate inferences tne jury mi: it - ~ •* analogy 
here, defense counsel's failure ' *•*--+ ->,- o Q U 3 i iy prejudicial 
because some c- . . _ •:.. ) 
object to also provided the basis for tne ury to draw 
inappropriate --nferences ^aar^im r h^ defense witnesses. 
not part of a deliberate triai strategy, *-.*L ratner a ranare IJ 
respond and react at the appropriate time. The errors should 
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have been obvious and plain to trial counsel who should have 
raised the appropriate objections. 
The impact of counsel's failure to object, just as the 
plainness of the errors, is not just academic. The errors would 
change any reasonable person's entire outlook on the eyewitness 
testimony. This case pits the State's single witness against the 
defense eyewitnesses. Although inmate Smith claimed that Mr. 
Carlson was responsible, he admitted that a blanket had been 
placed over his head at the time of the assault. "I [Smith] 
looked back, looked back to my left. That is when the blanket 
came over me. All I know is I went face first toward the bars." 
(R 290). 
The testimony of every other witness at the scene confirmed 
that Mr. Carlson was not present in the milieu but was across the 
cell washing out his blanket. (R 317, 328, 394, 339, 405). The 
testimony was not extreme or inherently incredible. They simply 
limited their testimony to what they saw. Todd Dennis candidly 
admitted, "I didn't actually see who hit him, but I know it 
wasn't Rick [Mr. Carlson] that did it. Rick was on the other 
side of the tier." (R 337). 
Ted Hall also only observed Mr. Carlson "standing at the big 
wash sink washing his blanket at the time." (R 317, 328). Mr. 
Hall heard threats from ff[t]he Mexicans", (R 324), not from Mr. 
Carlson. The Prosecution's jailor George Tonga suggested such a 
Mexican link through "Martinez", who had made threats in Spanish 
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and *as In close riioximity { "imoth/ Ijii' * swinging a towel ai 
t h e t i m e *- -^^ •!t?£,a.,:,f iD "-•-* * - —«o, specifically 
eA^ 
the momma + ' ^sses saw ^: . Carison at J :-e 
sinx no* t^ * - c ! 
T i 
improperly tainted uy the jiu. - ,L±WU ^ ...- onaut J. improper 
suggestions, msir.jations and, especially, assertions of personal 
k " ' - ' - -J v - • 
they should , L ^ p<_i _, carr> merger v. United » --~^. ---
U.£ 7S, 8^ 1935). Rathe, *. <. .eave the credibility 
determination * - ~rc^ c~v.<- i ~~ -"s^r'iated matters no t 
in evidence, b . j ' . j . . -. -
 4 I L ^ J I I j I 11111 11 i 1 1 , 1111 II 
persistently attacked the defense witnesses even though :* 
present^-^ ~- evidence -^ "-^rc^^ it*,r* ,np\!cnios. See also United 
States - r>* t-i i— ~~ 
[a prosecutor's assertion or personal oener r-a* i aerenaanr . ; 
guilty, is an implied »* emen*- thar r ^  prosecute**, * virtue >f 
his B^t,^ 
jury must convict . l'h« devastatma impact ut sue:, 'testimony' 
should be apparent There was r.c /jrat .ve instructions 
Cv. "-- " * MI'1 hi reversed. 
This ^c_ ;_ ,.... :i. . thai defendant was deprived of 
effective assistance of counsel because there ; s a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result uu uie defendant ii ueieiise 
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counsel had not remained silent and had brought objections to the 
trial court's attention. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
his conviction and to remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 14th day of March, 1996. 
ClarQc^. Nielsen 
HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
Richard Lynn Carlson 
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Tyrone E. Medley 
S . H e n s l e y 
D. T r i p p 
S. W i l l i a m s 
January 9 , 1995 
O The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by § 3 jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of a g ^ n U Hy
 a prTcnr io- r , a felony 
of the _ 3 r degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by K. C l a r k
 L and the State being represented by R. Y b a r r a is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
Q to a maximum mandatory term of 
a not to exceed five years; 
Q of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
a of not less than fiye years and which may be for life; 
O not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be for life; 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $- to. 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
S such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, Q Court, Count(s) _ 
D 
sentences now serving 
are hereby dismissed. 
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
a Defendant is remanded into the custody of t h ® j « ^ ^ 5 i ^ ^ ^ ^ $ i 5 S ^ t 3 for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitmer 
a Commitment shall issue f o r t h w i f h 
DATED this 9 t h 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page — i _ of 
(White—Court) (Gr««n—Judg«) (Y©«ow-J«iUPnson/APiP) (Pink—0«f«ns«) (GokJ«nrod— Slat*) 
*o-o-iuz.o. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault- ;„<- J- . 
of a felony of the third d ^ r e e ' ^ ^ t 0 C3USe b o d ^ ^u iy , is guilty 
is?irsr32 c-§ 1 935 3 3 , 7 6-5- i 0 2-5 ' e n a c t c d b^-
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime, 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punish-
able by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been 
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if 
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or 
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts 
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, 
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not 
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evi-
dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has 
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the 
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener-
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal 
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the 
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibil-
ity of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is neces-
sary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not 
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an 
appeal is admissible. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is The pendency of an appeal does not render a 
the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah conviction inadmissible. This is in accord with 
law by granting the court discretion in convic- Utah case law. State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 
tions not involving dishonesty or false state- 206 P. 717 (1922). 
ttient to refuse to admit the evidence if it would This rule is identical to Rule 609 of the Fed-
ta prejudicial to the defendant. Current Utah eral Rules of Evidence. The 1990 amendments 
law mandates the admission of such evidence, to the federal rule made two changes in the 
State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d rule. The comment to the federal rule accu-
1029 (1973); State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324 rately reflects the Committee's view of the pur-
i t a n 1976); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 pose of the amendments, 
^tah 1980). Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
There is presently no provision in Utah law ment, effective October 1, 1992, rewrote Subdi-
iimilar to Subsection (d). vision (a). 
